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Abstract 
 
In his Politica: Politics Methodically set Forth and Illustrated with Sacred 
and Profane Examples published in 1603 Johannes Althusius’ sets out his 
grand scheme of republican federalism. Soon, however, the final 
establishment of the territorial state and the paradigm of statism relegated 
grand federalism to the distant margins of constitutional theory. 
Statism as concisely enunciated in this article, recognises only two entities 
namely the state as a centralised power apparatus and the abstract 
individual on whom a statist identity in the image of the state is enforced. 
Statism dispenses with communities. 
Statism has been playing out on a continuum, with the statist-individualism 
on the one and statist-collectivism on the opposite extreme. Statist-
individualism seeks to fend off the risks of supreme political power with 
strategies for the protection of individual rights. In contrast, statist-
collectivism dispenses with the subtleties of statist-individualism and is 
distinctively more blatant in forging a homogeneous statist nation.  
In the face of the rise of claims of communities, the emergence of 
communitarian thinking and increased evidence of the receding territorial 
state, new - post statist - constitutional thinking is gathering strength. This 
has unleashed considerable interest in alternative thinking such as that of 
Althusius. 
Althusius’ grand federalism should be viewed, however, within the context 
of his broader constitutional thinking, which on close analysis, is constituted 
by four interlinked aspects namely: piety, justice and community; covenant 
(or contract); supremacy of the commonwealth and of the law; and political 
authority and public office. These tenets are the main focus of the present 
discussion.  
There is no room for a blanket transplantation of Althusian thinking into 
modern constitutional theory. However, it does provide a valuable source 
of communitarian theory for contemporary constitutional law. It brings to 
light that (individual) identity, morality, and a happy life and individual rights 
can only be conceived of within the framework of communities.  Moreover, 
Althusius’ convictions on (shared) popular sovereignty, in contrast to 
undivided (statist) sovereignty and his views on public office provided the 
framework for constitutionalism and limited government which could 
arguably improve on that of contemporary statist constitutionalism. 
Keywords 
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1 Introduction: Statism and Althusius 
Johannes Althusius' Politica: Politics Methodically Set Forth and Illustrated 
with Sacred and Profane Examples1 was published in 1603. Soon, however, 
it was close to complete oblivion, seldom referred to and at best considered 
as of marginal importance. Yet in the present increasingly post-statist era in 
which communities – cultural, local, religious, and linguistic – are vigorously 
(re)-claiming constitutional recognition, Althusius has rightly re-emerged as 
a prominent figure whose views cannot be ignored. Althusius' thinking 
constitutes a comprehensive anticipatory alternative to the politics of the 
territorial state, which has dominated political and constitutional practice and 
theory for the past almost four hundred years. In our age, marked by the 
subsiding dominance of the territorial state2 Althusius' thinking has become 
particularly relevant and is attracting considerable new attention.3 
In dealing with Althusius' thinking one might distinguish between the general 
tenets of his constitutionalism and his grand scheme of republican 
federalism. He is best known for the latter. That is also the focus of most 
contemporary commentaries on Althusius' work. To my mind Althusius' 
federal scheme cannot clearly be understood without a clear grasp of the 
general tenets of his thinking, which are in fact the premise of his federalism. 
Precisely for that reason this discussion scrutinises the general tenets of his 
constitutionalism. What is referred to here as Althusius' constitutional 
thinking could aptly also be termed political thinking since political and 
constitutional thinking in many respects overlap to such an extent that it is 
well-nigh impossible to distinguish between the two. I prefer "constitutional 
thinking", since Althusius conceived of a comprehensive constitutional order 
in which core constitutional concepts (also within the contemporary 
constitutional discourse) such as justice, sovereignty, subsidiarity, 
federalism, control and balance of power, public office and community all 
enjoyed prominence. I state this preference fully realising that the terms 
constitution and constitutionalism were not known in the lexicon of the 
public, more specifically political, discourse in Althusius' times. That, 
however, is not to say that these notions as such were unknown at the time. 
On the contrary, some of the most crucial concepts and constitutional 
arrangements, such as the separation of powers and the balance between 
worldly and ecclesiastical power emerged from an era long before the 
                                            
  Koos Malan. BAHons (UP), BIur LLB LLD (UNISA). Professor of Public Law, 
University of Pretoria. Email: Koos.malan@up.ac.za. 
1  Althusius Politica; Elazar "Althusius's Grand Design". 
2  On the term, "territorial state" see Malan Politiocracy 8 fn 28. 
3  De Benoist 2000 Telos 26. 
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advent of modernity.4 However, while acknowledging the overlap between 
political and constitutional theorising, I will at times refer to either as political 
thinking. 
Althusius represents a mode of thinking – the beginning of a countertradition 
– which was sharply at variance with that which underpins the discipline of 
the modern (territorial) statist tradition (or paradigm) of political thought 
(statism) as articulated by the founders (and latter exponents) of the statist 
tradition, namely thinkers such as Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes, John 
Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Karl Marx5 and innumerable other 
followers who have been active within the confines of this paradigm. 
The statist paradigm or statism encapsulates the dominant current in 
modern constitutional thinking since the advent of the territorial state6 in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Thus, the territorial state has defined 
the framework for thinking around politics not only in academic disciplines, 
such as constitutional law and political science, but also in public discourse 
in general. Statism also signifies that people adopt and cherish only one 
public identity, namely an individual identity in the image of the state, that 
is, statist identity.7 
Statism recognises two entities, namely the state and the individual: the 
state as a centralised power apparatus maintaining the public peace among 
antagonistic individuals with no public identity other than their identity as 
citizens of the state; that is, other than their statist identity. Statism does not 
recognise or tolerate any other identity than statist identity and is 
antagonistic towards any community which is not a statist community; that 
is, the homogenised collection of all inhabitants of the state. By the same 
token it rejects any apparatus of political authority apart from the state, or 
more specifically between the individual and the state. Such non-statist 
authority would be anathema to the statist paradigm since it is inimical to 
the very stability of the statist order itself. Statism proceeds from the 
premises of the fundamental absence of any real human community and of 
fundamentally antagonistic relations between abstract atomistic individuals 
combined with the state, as the centralised sovereign political force, 
                                            
4  See for example Berman Law and Revolution 213-214. Also see the relevant 
passage of the discussion on the rule of law by Fukuyama Origins of Political Order 
245-289. 
5  See on this Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 201. Also see Malan 2014 Tydskr 
Geesteswet 477-470. 
6  See in this regard Malan Politiocracy 43-50 and the sources cited there. 
7  Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 201. Also see Malan Politiocracy ch 6. 
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encapsulated in the legislative, executive and adjudicatory apparatus which 
has to keep the public peace. All individuals are considered to be essentially 
the same; and any differences that might exist between them are held to be 
more apparent than real and politically of no moment. 
Statism requires public identity to be monopolised for the benefit of the 
state. In consequence, only one community is recognised, namely a statist 
community comprising of all who find themselves within the boundaries of 
the territorial state and regardless of whether there exist any real bonds of 
culture, language, ethnicity or religion.8 All the citizens, as Bikuh Parekh 
insightfully states: 
… are expected to privilege their territorial over their other identities; to 
consider that they share in common as citizens far more important than what 
they share with other members of their religious, cultural and other 
communities; to define themselves and relate to each other as individuals to 
abstract away their religious, cultural and other views when conducting 
themselves as citizens; to relate to the state in an identical manner; and to 
enjoy an identical basket of rights and obligations.  In short, the state expects 
of all its citizens to subscribe to an identical way of defining themselves and 
relating to each other and the state.  This shared political self-understanding 
is its constitutive principle and necessary presupposition.  It can tolerate 
differences on all other matters but not this one, and uses educational, 
cultural, coercive and other means to secure that all its citizens share it.9 
Thus viewed the statist community is no real community at all but just a 
mass; any aggregate of persons or, in the words of John Locke,10 any 
number of men. In pursuance of statism there is a strict intolerance against 
any non-statist community, that is, any community of a cultural, linguistic, 
ethnic or religious nature which claims public recognition. In terms of a raft 
of programmes of homogenisation such communities are liquidated into a 
single uniform statist mass-society. These programmes are often called 
programmes of nation building – a misnomer because nations and national, 
cultural, ethnic and language communities are not built but destroyed by 
such programmes. They should therefore rather be referred to as 
programmes of nation destruction and not nation building, as Walker 
Connor remarked.11 To the extent that statism does tolerate such 
communities, they have to operate strictly in the private sphere, enjoying no 
public recognition or constitutional authority. In the final analysis the 
                                            
8  See in this regard the incisive analysis by Nisbet Quest for Community especially 
part 71-187 - the state and community and Malan Politiocracy 127-172. 
9  Parekh Rethinking Multiculturalism 185. 
10  Locke of Civil Government para 89. See the insightful comments on this by Van Dyke 
1976-77 World Politics 343-369 and Van Dyke 1974 Am J Pol Sci 725-741. 
11  Connor 1971-72 World Politics 336. 
K MALAN  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  5 
operative concepts of statist identity are homogenisation and uniformity – 
voluntarily if it can and forcibly if it must.12 
Since statism recognises but a single centralised power apparatus, no 
power should be vested in any institution other than the power apparatus of 
the centralised state. Federalism, devolution of power, communities or any 
mechanism that could dilute the centralisation of power is opposed. To the 
extent that such mechanisms might in limited circumstances be tolerated, it 
is basically an anomaly to statism. The public accommodation of diversity 
and of intermediary institutions with some political authority, existing 
between the state and the individual, is essentially anathema to the statist 
paradigm.13 
The two elements of statism – the abstract individual with his statist identity 
and the centralised power apparatus of the territorial state – determine the 
way in which all matters of public life, including crucial concepts such as the 
constitution, constitutionalism, rule of law and the Rechtstaat, sovereignty, 
citizenship, democracy, rights, and power are conceptualised. 
Statism is no monolith, however. Over time it has been playing out on a 
continuum with an individualist approach on the one extreme and a 
collectivist approach on the other. However, the homogenising territorial 
state remains essential all over the continuum, encompassing the full 
spectrum of important ideological currents – left, right and liberal.14 Precisely 
for that reason the designations preferred are not individualistic or 
collectivist but specifically statist-individualistic and statist-collectivist. 
Alongside the state, statist-individualism posits alongside the free 
("sovereign") individual, perceived to be capable and at liberty to make free 
choices on his/her own personal identity and life style. The concept of 
freedom in this case is so-called negative freedom, that is, freedom or 
immunity from intervention or prescription by the state. The cultivation and 
enforcement of a statist public identity, on the basis of assimilating a 
multicultural and otherwise diverse society into a single statist society as 
prescribed in terms of any (statist) ideology, is less overt and more tacit and 
                                            
12  It is significant to note that the onslaught on non-dominant communities prevails over 
the entire ideological spectrum – left, right and centre (liberal) as it were. The 
common denominator of all these anti-community trends is statism. See in this 
regard Malan 2014 Tydskr Geesteswet 462-480. 
13  This was dominant in the thinking of Rousseau and exponents of other trends of 
thinking in pre-revolutionary France. See the discussion by De Tocqueville Ancient 
Regime 158-168, and Malan Politiocracy 231-242. 
14  Malan 2014 Tydskr Geesteswet 462-480. See also McRae 1979 CJPS 681-682. 
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subtle. The statist-individualist current acknowledges the risks of supreme 
political power and seeks to fend that off with strategies for the protection of 
individual rights (currently most popularly in a bill of rights which is part of a 
"supreme constitution") most prominently by an independent and impartial 
judiciary in terms of the threefold separation of governmental power.  
The opposite – the statist-collectivist approach – dispenses with the 
subtleties of statist-individualism. Any concern for the free individual is 
absent or at least much less pronounced. In contrast to statist-individualism, 
statist-collectivism is distinctively more overt and often brutal in forging a 
homogeneous statist nation. The state-nation is the collective agent for the 
sake of which all particular communities have to dissolve and individuals 
have to change and convert in order to be remade in the image of the 
homogenous statist nation. Ordinarily the mould of the state-nation is 
provided by the dominant faction of the state population into which all non-
dominant communities have to be assimilated. 
In terms of statist-individualism the state – Leviathan, the mortal god as 
Hobbes described it – is aloof. It is authoritarian but not absolutist and 
totalitarian. It insists on the obedience of its subjects and enforces the public 
peace. However, it does not insist on a flock – a statist nation – to be created 
in its image. In statist-collectivism, however, Leviathan is totalitarian, though 
not necessarily absolutist. This mortal god, historically a later outgrowth of 
an older and more aloof one, is much more caring and much more jealous. 
It insists on a flock in its own image, and tolerates no apostasy – 
membership of and public allegiance to a different community. When such 
non-statist apostasy occurs, punishment is sure to follow because no 
community other than the statist flock forged in the image of the state is 
tolerated.15 
Between statist-individualism and statist-collectivism there is an array of 
variations. 
Statist-individualism, for which John Locke was arguably the prototypical 
protagonist,16 places the emphasis on individual rights to be acknowledged 
and guaranteed by the state. The contemporary liberal and social 
democratic states of Western Europe and North America may be viewed as 
the prime examples of statist-individualism. However, in view of the varying 
state-sponsored statist identities and wide-ranging social and economic 
                                            
15  See Malan Politiocracy ch 6, 9. 
16  As set out in the second treatise of Locke Of Civil Government.  
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interventions of the state, none of these states will be found on the extreme 
end of statist individualism. 
The collectivist extreme of statism (statist-collectivism) drew inspiration and 
found justification in two trends of thinking: on the one hand, that provided 
by the work of Jean Jacques Rousseau, and on the other, by utilitarianism 
incepted by Jeremy Bentham. Endeavouring to establish a totalitarian 
republicanism in which the closest possible bonds between a close-knit 
monolithic citizenry and their state should be forged, Rousseau could 
tolerate neither a multitude of communal identities, nor individualism, which 
to him was no genuine expression of freedom but rather a dreadful 
aberration of freedom. People have to be rescued from their wrong ways 
and "forced to be free",17 that is, forced to be assimilated into a state-
prescribed identity and way of life. That identity usually emanated from the 
dominant, usually the majority community within the state, which provided 
the mould within which all others – communities and individuals – have to 
be cast. Modern totalitarianism, most notably that of the Jacobins in 
revolutionary France, Bolshevism in Soviet Russia and Maoism in China, all 
drew inspiration from this mode of usually majoritarian-driven politics.18 The 
spirit of Rousseau can also be detected in right-wing totalitarianism – 
Fascism and National-socialism.19 
On close analysis utilitarianism, as for example conceived by Bentham, 
provides the other original impetus for statist collectivism. In the name of 
what is perceived to serve the interest of the majority best (which is identified 
with the public good) utilitarianism also disregards deviant communities and 
(the rights of) individuals and enforces on all20 that which the majority would 
perceive to be most feasible. There are vast differences between the statist-
individualism and statist-collectivism. The former may claim to have a keen 
concern for the dignity and the rights of individuals, specifically against the 
claims of the majority, in contrast to the latter which would be much more 
inclined to place individual integrity on the altar of the perceived Volente 
Generale as conceived and inspired by Rousseau,21 or the perceived 
predominant interest of the majority of people as conceived by utilitarianism, 
originating from Bentham. Moreover, these differences are underscored by 
                                            
17  Rousseau The Social Contract 64. 
18  See the lucid exposition of Nisbet Quest for Community ch 7. In this regard also see 
Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 170, 180-181. 
19  See the remarks by Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 206. 
20  Lucidly explained by Nisbet Quest for Community 156-160.  
21  Rousseau The Social Contract 69 and further. For a concise discussion of the 
relevant aspects of Rousseau's political thinking, see Malan Politiocracy 131-142. 
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the fact that the individualist and the collectivist currents provide the premise 
for the two great ideological struggles of the twentieth century, namely first 
the struggle between liberal democracy and fascism, and subsequently the 
struggle between liberal democracy and communism in the guises of 
Bolshevism and Maoism. 
Yet, although opposing one another on account of their respective 
individualism and collectivism, they share fundamental assumptions. They 
are currents within statism, united in a common premise, rendering them 
opposing forces but within the same common tradition of political and 
constitutional theory.22 That unity is to be found in their common statist 
premise. Precisely for that reason the two currents are not referred to here 
as individualist and collectivist but more specifically statist-individualist and 
statist-collectivist. 
Premised on the same statist basis the territorial state takes centre stage in 
both currents of thinking on constitutional law to such an extent that political 
science has in fact become the study or science of the state 
(staatsleer/Staatslehre) whilst, by the same token, constitutional law has 
become the law of the state quite overtly implied by the Dutch and German 
names for the respective disciplines namely staatsreg/staatsregt/Staats- 
recht. In consequence the statist tradition also does not take any particular 
interest in political and constitutional thinking that do not share statism's 
fundamental assumptions. It is fixated on the state and the individual thus 
ignoring, and often justifying even pernicious policies for the destruction of 
communities23 and any other intermediary entity between the state and the 
individual or in place of the state. To the extent that it may be making 
concessions to such entities, it does so strictly within the confines of statist 
thinking.24 
The statist tradition is distinctively positivist in that the existing territorial 
states have set the paradigm within which political and constitutional 
thinking have taken place over many centuries since the dawn of the 
territorial state.25 Moreover, the dominant concepts and themes of reflection 
                                            
22  This evidenced by the fact that all these trends have in common that they act against 
small languages and cultures in the states in which these ideologies have gained the 
upper-hand. See Malan 2014 Tydskr Geesteswet 462-480. 
23  Van Dyke 1974 Am J Pol Sci 726. See further Pestieau 1991 Can J Law Jurisprud 
369-370. 
24  See for example the discussion of self-determination by Malan Politiocracy 246-267. 
25  This is one of the main themes of Nisbet's discussion in his 1990 Quest for 
Community. 
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in the field of constitutional law and political philosophy as well as in political 
practice are all statist in nature, that is, conditioned by and safeguarded for 
the territorial state. The accepted meaning of these concepts serves the 
specific needs of the territorial state. Thus, citizenship is citizenship of the 
state; democracy is statist democracy, that is, democracy made safe for the 
modern state - democracy converted from an unruly and incoherent master 
to a docile and dependable servant.26 Human rights also presuppose the 
indispensability of the state.  Dependent individuals now have no option but 
to resort to the state for protection since communal bonds have 
disappeared, leaving individuals with no choice but to seek protection from 
the state.27 Moreover, both the statist-collectivist as well as the statist-
individualist currents are united in their pursuance of forging a single public 
identity, namely a monolithic statist identity, out of the multitude of 
particularist communities within the boundaries of the territorial state in 
question which, as indicated, goes by the misleading name of nation-
building. The collectivist current tends to go about this coercively and in a 
brazen and totalitarian way; the individualist trend is pursued more indirectly 
and subtly. However, they remain united in their efforts to allow only one 
single statist identity.28 
The thinking of Althusius is a distinctive alternative to statism. His thinking 
represents a wide-ranging world view which is the subject matter of three 
equally valid perspectives on his constitutional thinking.  
First, it is a compendium of pre-modern – Classical and Medieval – thought. 
Secondly, it provides the first wide ranging response to the then germinating 
basic premises of statism, and in so doing established the basis for a 
countertradition in political and constitutional theory.29 
Thirdly, it provides the basis for a post-statist, and in a sense post-modern, 
theory of federal republicanism30 a theory for which Althusius is best known. 
Concerning the first: Althusius is a political philosopher in the Reformist 
tradition who built a systematic political philosophy out of the Reformed 
                                            
26  Dunn "Conclusion" 248. 
27  Diamond "Rule of Law" 124. 
28  See on this Malan Politiocracy ch 6. 
29  See Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 67, 106, 201-202. 
30  Elazar "Althusius's Grand Design" xxxv. All grand designs of federalism subsequent 
to Althusius, Elazar observes, until the mid-nineteenth century derived from 
Althusius. Arguablu Althusius also provided the basis for what Huegin Early Modern 
Concepts 228 called a model of cosmopolitan government. 
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experience.31 Thomas Hueglin noted that the Aristotelian tradition of the 
active citizen provided the socio-philosophical logic for political participation. 
The convent idea of the Old Testament provided the constitutional logic of 
shared sovereignty and control of government and the Germanic tradition 
of communitarianism and fellowship provided the basic sociological 
structures of the political organisation of Althusius constitutionalism.32 
Daniel Elazar aptly commented that Althusius synthesised the experience 
of the Holy Roman Empire with the political ideas of the covenant theology 
of Reformed Protestantism.33 In consequence he drew extensively from the 
Decalogue and other Biblical sources.34 However, Althusius, does not limit 
himself to Reformist thinking. On the contrary, he drew extensively from 
philosophical, theological and juridical sources in the broader Roman 
Catholic tradition as it had emerged though the medieval era. His thinking 
is also profoundly informed by Classical (non-religious) sources. Hence he 
identified natural law with the second table of the Decalogue.35 Having 
drawn considerably from Aristotle, Althusius is also an Aristotelian par 
excellence.36 In the premises it may be asserted that Althusius is the 
quintessential Christian humanist, who amalgamated Christian doctrine and 
humanist thinking into a single (logically) comprehensive system of thought. 
The very title of his work bears the best testimony to that, because what he 
consistently and thoroughly does is in exact accordance with  the title of his 
book, namely to methodically set forth and illustrate his politics with both 
sacred and profane examples. 
Secondly, Althusius' Christian humanist view also accounts for his rejection 
(in anticipation) of the modernist, more in particular Hobbesian view of the 
essential absence of human community and, the assertion instead, of 
                                            
31  He was a second generation political Calvinist and described as the one writer of the 
theory of the Dutch revolt against the Catholic Spanish king. See on this the remarks 
by Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 24, 25. 
32  Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 69. Elsehwere Hueglin encapsulated the most 
important influences on Althusius as follows: "Althusius derived his political 
convictions and theoretical strengths from three mutually reinforcing strands of 
political theory and practice that all converged at the time: political Calvinism as a 
newly developed survival doctrine for religious minorities, the Politics of Aristotle as 
a rediscovered historical affirmation of the co-operative sociability embedded in 
human nature and finally the living tradition of Germanic communitarianism and 
fellowship." 
33  Elazar "Althusius's Grand Design" xxxv. 
34  There are no fewer than two thousand quotations according to Hueglin's count. 
Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 56. 
35  Sabine History of Political Theory 416-417. Althusius is in step here with a broad 
phenomenon of his time. Hugo de Groot had the same convictions. Also see De 
Benoist 2000 Telos 47-48. 
36  Sabine History of Political Theory 417. 
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people being basically atomist, pursuing only their own interests and finding 
themselves fundamentally in a relationship of animosity with all other 
individuals. Althusius strongly rejected nominalism, the precursor of 
liberalism, according to which there was nothing ontologically real outside 
the lone individual.37 In contrast to (individualist) nominalism, communities 
are in Althusius' view prior to individuals (individual members).38 Society 
does not consist primarily of vying abstract individuals but rather of people 
living together and cooperating within communities. His outlook is not the 
Hobbesian one of bellum omnia contra omnes but rather of consociatio 
symbiotica. This view allowed Alhusius to be a communitarian, pluralist and 
federalist instead of a liberal, uniformist and centralist, who developed a 
compound bottom-up federalism instead of providing an apology for the 
sovereign territorial state as Hobbes did.39 
Thirdly, apart from being an exponent of the late medieval vision of society, 
Althusius may be viewed as an exponent of post-modern and post-statist 
federalism which accounts not only for individual rights but also, very 
importantly, for the existence and claims of communities to which juridical 
and political rights must be attributed in the public sphere.40  Althusius 
exerted influence between the medieval and modern eras. He is quite 
justifiably considered as the person who discovered most of the key 
elements of federalism.41 
The domination of statism has just about silenced the voice of Althusius for 
more than three centuries, but now that intellectual and material forces are 
causing increased pressure to come to bear upon the territorial state and 
on statism, Althusius is once again enjoying prominence on the stage of 
constitutional and political theory. Thus Daniel Elazar quite aptly states: 
                                            
37  De Benoist  2000 Telos 32. 
38  De Benoist 2000 Telos 32. 
39  Huegin Early Modern Concepts 44 noted that Althusius' thinking, in contrast to that 
of Hobbes (and Bodin) was informed by his more positive experience with his 
immediate environment. "Unlike Bodin and Hobbes whose circumstances of life were 
marked by negative experiences (such as those brought about by the sharp religious 
divisions in France and the Massacre of St Bartolomew, and the English civil war, 
respectively) Althusius' experience was still positive. He could still subscribe to the 
notion of active citizenship and shared sovereignty. Bodin and Hobbes rejected the 
notion of multiplicity of communities as gravely dangerous for the survival of political 
society. They also regarded undivided state sovereignty and absolutism over aloof, 
detached and passive subjects (as against active citizens) to be a prerequisite for 
the survival of the political society - political society in the form of monolithic state." 
40  De Benoist 2000 Telos 54. 
41  De Benoist 2000 Telos 54. 
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To read Althusius is to discover how important his ideas are for our times. 
Eclipsed for three centuries by the major thrust of the modern epoch towards 
the homogeneous nation-state built around the individual citizen, standing 
politically naked before the state machinery, Althusian ideas seem much more 
in place in the postmodern epoch, with its more modern networks, its renewed 
recognition of primordial groups and political associations as part and parcel 
of contemporary political life, and the federalist striving for both universalism 
and particularism, ecumene and community.42 
However, Althusius represents much more than that. His ideas set the basis 
for a tradition of constitutional thinking in direct opposition to the statist 
tradition in general. Not only were his ideas partly in direct opposition to 
those of Jean Bodin43 but they also assumed the nature of a wide-ranging 
anticipatory response and present an alternative to the concepts that in time 
became fundamental traits of statism. 
Althusius was born in 1557 in Diebenshausen in Westphalia. He studied 
theology and law in Cologne and Basel, and eventually graduated as a 
doctor in law. He was attached to the Reformed Academy at Herborn in 
Nassau, of which he became the rector in 1597. From 1604 he occupied a 
position on the Syndic of Emden in East Friesland, a leading Calvinist city, 
which enabled him to play a leading role in the leadership of the city until 
his death in 1638.44 Apart from a number of other works he published his 
greatest work, his Politica, the subject matter of the present discussion, in 
1603. His work was prominently inspired by his experience of the leading 
city politician of Emden (at that stage also known as the Geneva of the 
North45) who sought to justify the autonomy of Emden (and of cities in 
general) in order to avoid the absorption of the city of Emden, in the face of 
the rising territorialism of his time, into the province in which Emden was 
located.46 
Althusius dealt with many issues in his Politica, all, however, forming part of 
his comprehensive and in my view strikingly coherent federal 
constitutionalism. Some issues such as those relating to democracy,47 
language and community,48 legal effectiveness,49 matters pertaining to 
                                            
42  Elazar "Althusius's Grand Design" xlvi. 
43  Althusius is in debate with Bodin at various places, eg at Althusius Politica 72, 105, 
130, 149, 173. 
44  Carney "Translators Introduction" xi-xii. 
45  Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 33. 
46  Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 32-37, 44, 60, 164. 
47  Althusius Politica 206. 
48  Althusius Politica 85. 
49  Althusius Politica 177. 
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criminal law,50 just war51 and a number of others, were not dealt with in 
depth. They will also not feature in the present discussion. On reading the 
Politica the following five primary themes, comprising his constitutional 
thinking, come to the fore: 
a) piety, justice and community;  
b) covenant (or contract); 
c) supremacy of the commonwealth and of the law;  
d) political authority and public office; and 
e) Althusius's scheme of federalism. 
The first four of these constitute the general tenets of Altusius' 
constitutionalism that will now be discussed. The first four: piety, justice and 
community; covenant (or contract); supremacy of the commonwealth and of 
the law; political authority and public office, are the general tenets of 
Althusius' constitutionalism, that is, the ideal elements. The fifth theme 
referred to above, namely the system of republican federalism, outlines the 
real elements, that is, the main structures and mechanisms, for the 
equitable accommodation of all individuals and communities, the just 
exercising of authority and for the control and balance of power. It falls 
outside the present discussion. 
2 The foundational tenets of Althusius' constitutionalism 
2.1 Piety, justice and commonwealth (community) 
Althusius' thinking on these three aspects is closely interlinked and 
therefore needs to be assessed as a whole. Althusius is a communitarian 
par excellence for whom human beings as symbiotes ideally live in a 
community of piety under God and as a community of justice under an 
encompassing federal republican constitution. Althusius took a view 
diametrically opposed to that of Hobbes for whom, save for the worldly 
Leviathan, the human condition is God-forsaken and devoid of the bonds 
that make up human community, and is finally no more than a mechanical 
social compact based on the rational choice of isolated individuals solely 
directed towards the achievement of personal individual gain in the face of 
all other individual adversaries. For Althusius human life is not merely this 
                                            
50  Althusius Politica 83, 139-140, 144, 146, 177, 179, 180. 
51  Althusius Politica 88-89. 
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artificial body as Hobbes viewed it.52 In contrast to Hobbes and Rousseau, 
Althusius is of the view that the social pact is not an event which for the first 
time entailed the artificial establishment of a society comprising basically of 
antagonist individuals. For Althusius, according to the summary by De 
Benoist, there is a progressive organisation of organic communities of 
various sizes in which communities, not individuals, are the composite parts: 
If people enter into a contract, "(t)hey do so as members of an already 
existing community…"53 In Althusius' view symbiotic association is much 
more than merely existing together. As Frederick Carney correctly points 
out, it indicated the quality of group life characterised by piety and justice 
without which, Althusius believed, neither individuals nor societies could 
endure.54 
The most comprehensive community is religious – a community of piety to 
the glory of God. At the same time there is a community of justice towards 
fellow human beings – symbiotes – to secure for each her/his due. In 
pursuance of this conviction Althusius states that we should live temperately 
towards ourselves, justly towards our neighbour, and piously towards 
God.55 The communities of piety and justice result from the very nature of 
mankind as ordained by God. Thus Althusius declares: 
The universal symbiotic communion is both ecclesiastical and secular. 
Corresponding to the former are religion and piety, which pertain to the welfare 
and eternal life of the soul, and the entire first table of the Decalogue. 
Correspondingly to the latter is justice, which concerns the use of the body 
and of this life, and the rendering to each his due, the second table of the 
Decalogue. In the former, everything is to be rendered immediately to the glory 
of God; in the latter to the utility of the welfare of the people associated in one 
body. These are to functions of every good association. Whenever a turning 
away from them has begun, the happiness of the realm or universal 
association is diminished.56 
In the premises, in Althusius' view justice and community are mutually 
implied. A (sound) community is a prerequisite for and the embodiment of 
justice. Justice protects the integrity of the community by giving to all parts, 
including all individuals, their due in accordance with the particular 
                                            
52  Sabine History of Political Theory 417; Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 44. 
53  De Benoist 2000 Telos 52. 
54  Carney "Translators Introduction" xv. Quite clearly, there is no such thing in 
Althusius' thought as a self-made man. See for example Althusius Politica 17-18. 
55  Althusius Politica 74. 
56  Althusius Politica 75. 
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characteristics of each part, thus securing the corresponding happiness of 
all – of the community and all its parts.57 
Althusius' views on community and the individual are in sharp contrast with 
the modernist outlook, especially the extreme version as articulated by and 
modified since Hobbes. In Althusian thinking there is no radical atomist 
individualism and extreme liberalism which proceeds from a sharp 
disavowal of the (existence of) communities.58 There is no understanding of 
society as anything more than an arbitrary aggregate of people,59 that is, a 
conglomerate of fundamentally isolated individuals who contracted into an 
artificial society purely for the sake of public peace, controlled conflict 
resolution and the attainment of personal gain. Althusius holds directly 
opposite views. Writing about the city, Althusius highlights the notion of 
community based on the ius symbioticum, which stands in stark contrast to 
a crowd, gathering, multitude, assemblage or throng, which is not a 
community and which lacks ius symbioticom.60 For Althusius, harking back 
to Aristotle, communal life manifesting in a wide variety of communities is a 
                                            
57  This brings to mind the Aristotelian notion of justice and fairness, which is also 
inextricably related to the notion of community. A community is a community 
because everyone shares in it: by contributing, each according to his/her specific 
abilities and characteristics, each member has the benefit of mutual exchange and 
of satisfying the full variety of needs of every member thanks to the availability of the 
full spectrum of "products" forthcoming from the activities of all the members.  See 
Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 111-145. Injustice and a breach of law would occur 
when there was disproportionality, that is, when someone received more or less than 
what was due to him/her (Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 112-113, 120). This would 
not only be unjust to the individual members immediately concerned but also a 
violation of the integrity of the community. 
58  As most blatantly encapsulated in the thinking of Thomas Hobbes' notorious 
description in Leviathan 186 of the state of nature: "In such condition, there is no 
place for Industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no 
Culture of the Earth, no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported 
by Sea, no commodious Building, no Instruments of moving, and removing such 
things that require much force, no Knowledge of the face of the Earth, no account of 
Time, no Arts, no Letters, no Society, and which is worst of all continual fear, and 
danger of violent death, And the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." 
59  Locke's depiction of the state of nature is rather dreadful. See Malan Politiocracy 88-
92. He also does not accept community as a basic reality. Later thinkers in this same 
tradition such as Jeremy Bentham also blatantly rejected the existence of 
community. Bentham answered as follows the question as to what a community is 
in his 1789 Principles of Morals and Legislation: "The community is a fictitious body, 
composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting as it were its 
members. The interest of the community then – is what? The sum of the several 
interests of the members who composed it." Bentham Principles of Morals and 
Legislation ch 1 iv. 
60  Althusius Politica 39. 
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natural given of the human condition. Justice encapsulates, expresses and 
regulates this natural communal (symbiotic) reality.  
The paired concepts of commonwealth and justice encapsulated in the 
notion of the ius symbioticum also account in one breath for both the 
integrity of communities and the recognition and protection of all individuals, 
including each individual within the commonwealth. Drawing on Plutarch 
(and Biblical authority) Althusius declares that the commonwealth is "(b)est 
and happiest when magistrates and citizens bring everything together for its 
welfare and advantage, and neither neglect nor despise anyone who can 
be helpful to the commonwealth".61 
However, as noted, for Althusius community was not only an immanent 
reality of the human condition, that is, a condition of people as symbiotes 
living together in this world. It was also transcendental, because it was 
communion between God and humanity (the human community). The 
transcendental (the community) found expression in human piety towards 
God in accordance with the first table of the Decalogue.  
The immanent community was equally divinely ordained in the second table 
of the Decalogue. Hence, Althusius could view the Decalogue as political in 
nature "(i)nsofar as it directs symbiotic life and prescribes what ought to be 
done therein."62 Thus he declared as follows about this encompassing 
(transcendental and immanent) ontology: 
For the Decalogue teaches the pious and just life; piety towards God and 
justice towards symbiotes. If symbiosis is deprived of these qualities it should 
not so much be called a political and human society as a beastly congregation 
of vice-ridden men.63 
Althusius' views on justice based on the second table of the Decalogue were 
reinforced by non-religious sources, most importantly by the views of 
Aristotle. The second table teaches justice among symbiotes. There is 
justice precisely for the purpose of universal symbiotic communion for "… 
the utility and the welfare of the people …" that ensures to each his due.64 
                                            
61  Althusius Politica 22. 
62  Althusius Politica 147. 
63  Althusius Politica 147. Althusius reflects here the views of St Augustine. This view 
of the dual and combined religious and worldly union is a golden thread resonating 
through Althusius' thinking.  
64 Althusius is not concerned only with justice but also with piety, that which pertains to 
eternal life, the basis of which to be found in the first Decalogue. Althusius Politica 
75. 
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Thus law should be there for the conservation of justice and universal 
association – the bond that holds the commonwealth together.65 
Illuminating his firm conviction on the natural and God-ordained basis of 
community, Althusius emphasised that God did not give everything to one 
person, but he distributed gifts among human beings. In consequence, 
single human beings are weak and dependent on others66 and must 
therefore live together in communities and finally in an encompassing 
community of mutually dependent people67 all of whom contribute their 
"specialised" gifts and thus enable genuine and wholesome human life, 
which is life within a commonwealth. 
Althusius declares: 
Correspondingly, while some persons provided for others and some received 
from others what they themselves lacked, all came together into a certain 
public body that we call the commonwealth, and by mutual aid devoted 
themselves to the general good and welfare of this body.68 
For Althusius, resonating with Aristotle, civil society (the commonwealth) is 
as natural and fundamental as individuals. Man is by nature a gregarious 
animal born for cultivating society with other men. People are not inherently 
separated from one another and therefore incapable of being to the 
advantage of others.69 On the contrary, people by their very nature eagerly 
strive for association. Echoing Aristotle, Althusius states that those who do 
not wish to live in society or are not in need of anything because all their 
needs are satisfied in abundance, are not part of the commonwealth. Any 
person meeting this description is either a beast or a god.70 
On this score community (the commonwealth) and individuals can be 
viewed as fundamentally equal in human life. It is significant to note that 
Althusius, unlike Hobbes and Locke and the proponents of the ensuing 
liberal tradition, does not use the term "individual", or phrases such as "an 
aggregate of men" or "any number of men" that discounts community. 
Instead, he speaks of symbiotes and symbiotic life, namely people living 
                                            
65  Althusius Politica 80. 
66  Althusius Politica 18. 
67  Althusius Politica 23 
68  Althusius Politica 23. 
69  Althusius Politica 22-23. Goosen Oor Gemeenskap en Plek developed a wide-
ranging apology for a communitarian politics in which he rejects the absence of 
community as essentially an anomaly. See specifically section A of the book under 
the heading "Monsters en mense". 
70  Althusius Politica 25. Also see Goosen Oor Gemeenskap en Plek section A, who 
expands on this question in consideranble detail.  
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together in a commonwealth, that is, in mutual dependence, each making a 
valuable contribution, by way of gifts received by him or her, thus enabling 
a plausible and happy existence of all.71 This mode of thinking 
acknowledges the equal originality, significance and value of the individual 
and the community in the same breath, and thus overcomes the extreme 
choices for either hyper individualism or hyper collectivism, something 
which one encounters in statist-individualism and statist-collectivism. 
Justice and the legal order have to account for this natural reality of 
community life, (and would on that score be viewed as natural law). The 
(just) legal order maintains the integrity of community by due recognition of 
all parts and by keeping them in balance. It satisfies the needs of each 
symbiote and the self-sufficiency and mutuality of the whole.72 Althusius 
states: 
Then, this world has so great and so admirable a diversity … that unless it be 
held together by some order of subordination, and regulated by fixed laws of 
subjection and order, it would be destroyed in a short time by its own 
confusion. Nor can the diverse parts of it endure if each part seeks to perform 
its own function indifferently and heedlessly by itself.73 
2.2 Covenant (or contract) 
In the discussion above the distinction between the modernist conception 
of the social contract and the communitarian outlook of Althusius that 
resonates the views of Aristotle has been highlighted. The former, as 
articulated in the most extremist form by Hobbes, is radically atomist. It 
rejects the notion of human community/ties as a fundamental fact of the 
human condition.74 The lone individual (fundamentally a mirror-image of all 
other individuals) is the sole raw material within the human condition and 
associations can be conceived only as a derivative, that is, as an artificial 
offshoot which is a product of a social contract concluded among human 
beings in pursuit of private (and personal, specifically materialistic) gain. In 
terms of the contract the dismal state of nature in which conflict prevails is 
brought to a close. This paves the way for the civic (political) state organised 
by the refereeing sovereign force of the statist Leviathan. The contract does 
not reflect the existence of a community in any real sense; it is merely a 
mechanism in terms of which a mass of basically mutually antagonistic 
persons is organised in terms of legal rules to keep the peace, thus enabling 
individuals to achieve their private ends. Political society is therefore nothing 
                                            
71  Althusius Politica 23. 
72  Althusius Politica 19. 
73  Althusius Politica 25 
74  A synopsis of Hobbesian political thought is given in Malan Politiocracy 75-85. 
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more than a society of individual rights-bearers and not a society aimed at 
pursuing a common good. To the extent that a common good can be 
attributed to this state, it is limited to a common understanding of the claims 
that individuals enforce against one another in terms of their individual 
entitlements. 
There is also a pre-modern strand of contract theory dating back to the 
thirteenth century. In this tradition the notion of contract is encapsulated in 
government compacts that circumscribe the rights of office bearers invested 
with political authority and the loyalty and obedience that the citizenry owe 
them in return for a solemn undertaking of good government. This strand of 
contract theory is closely related to the notions of sovereignty of the law and 
popular sovereignty75 because the contracting parties bind themselves to 
the law and the customs of the populace. This approach found expression 
in the then existing political communities. It is clearly far removed from the 
fictitious Hobbesian contract in terms of which society was for the first time 
established as part of the war believed to be raging in the state of nature. 
Althusius' thinking builds on this pre-modern view of contract and must be 
clearly distinguished from the modernist contract theory of Hobbes. More 
specifically, Althusius explains the existence of political community in terms 
of its various underpinning causes.76 Althusius' contractual politics are in 
nature federative, as it were, and in terms thereof sovereignty is defined as 
the co-sovereignty of a people organised in a plurality of partially 
autonomous spatial as well as social constituencies.77 Thus, Althusius 
states that the efficient cause of political association is consent and 
agreement among the communicating citizens. Althusius deals with the 
formal cause of political association as follows: 
The formal cause is indeed the association brought about by contributing and 
communicating one with the other, in which political men institute, maintain 
and conserve the fellowship of human life through decisions about those 
things useful and necessary to this social life.78 
This "formal cause" of political association is distinguished from the final 
cause of politics explained by Althusius as follows: 
The final cause of politics is the enjoyment of a comfortable, useful and happy 
life, and the common welfare – that we may live with piety and honour a 
peaceful and quite life, that while true piety toward God and justice amongst 
the citizens may prevail at home, defence against the enemy from abroad may 
                                            
75  Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 177 
76  The various causes reflect Aristotelian metaphysical explanation, see Goosen Oor 
Gemeenskap en Plek 231-257, which deals with these causes in detail. 
77  Heuglin Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 87, 183. 
78  Althusius Politica 24. 
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be maintained, and that concord and peace may always and everywhere 
thrive …The material politics is the aggregate of precepts for  those things, 
services and right that we bring together, each fairly and properly according 
to his ability for symbiosis and the common advantage of the social life.79 
(Althusius' notion of the virtuous citizen also comes to the fore in this 
context. The best members of a community are those who meet their own 
needs and who are also able to help others. "The greater the good he 
communicates with others, the better and more outstanding the member 
is."80) 
In Althusius' discussion of the constitution of the supreme magistrate, the 
concept of contract once again surfaces prominently. Referring to 
appropriate authority, Althusius first asserts, as he does in a number of other 
places in his work, that the commonwealth (as an institution) is older and 
more important than the magistrate. The commonwealth in fact constitutes 
the magistrate.81  Althusius then proceeds as follows: 
And so no realm or commonwealth has ever been founded or instituted except 
by contract entered into one with the other, by covenants agreed upon by 
subjects and their future prince, and by an established mutual obligation that 
both should religiously observe. When this obligation is dishonoured, the 
power of the prince loses its strength and is ended. Whence it follows that the 
people can exist without a magistrate, but a magistrate cannot exist without 
the people.82 
This illustration in broad outline of the difference between the modernist 
(specifically Hobbesian) views on social contract and those held by 
Althusius can now be examined further. The first difference appears from 
Althusius` view that the commonwealth precedes the covenant (the 
contract). The commonwealth is not created by a contract but it is a 
prerequisite - a conditio sine qua non - for a contract. This (first) difference 
gives rise to the second one, namely:  the purpose served by the contract 
in terms of the modernist view is totally different from the purpose served by 
the contract in terms of Althusius' view. Whereas in the modernist concept 
the contract creates society, the Althusian view is that communal life is 
Godly ordained and a natural given, thus allowing symbiotes to enter into 
agreements not to create communities but to refine organisation within 
existing communities. As to his belief that community is a product of nature, 
Althusius draws on the well-known Aristotelian view, which is advanced in 
the Politea, when he asserts that the commonwealth or civil society is a 
                                            
79  Althusius Politica 24. 
80  Althusius Politica 25. 
81  Althusius Politica 122. 
82  Althusius Politica 122. 
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product of nature, and that man is by nature a civil animal who strives 
eagerly for association.83 Althusian covenants merely refine the 
mechanisms of governance within the existing commonwealth (which in 
Althusius' view should be done on the basis of popular sovereignty and 
sovereignty of the law, the details of which are described in 2.3 below). The 
third difference, which also pertains to the purpose of the contract,  is that 
the modernist contract merely serves as a means for regulating conflict 
amongst isolated and antagonistic individuals; in contrast, the Althusian 
covenant, encapsulated in his views of the final cause of politics, facilitates 
and promotes a life of happiness and justice among people, not only as 
individuals, but more specifically as citizens in the encompassing and 
common enterprise, which is their (the citizens') commonwealth. 
The place and function of covenant in Althusian constitutionalism is nothing 
new. It has a long tradition in political philosophy – an established pre-
modern lineage of contract theory – that differs fundamentally from the 
Hobbesian lineage. This traditional covenant theory in fact occupies a 
crucial place in pre-modern constitutionalism.84 Althusius draws on this 
lineage.85 
2.3 The sovereignty of the commonwealth and of the law 
Sovereignty is a core notion in Althusius' thinking. It is a guiding principle 
running through the whole of the Politica. Althusius subscribes to the 
sovereignty of the commonwealth and to sovereignty of the law, which in 
step with a long-standing tradition were not conflicting notions, as they now 
are in terms of contemporary constitutional doctrine, but a single coherent 
system.86 Moreover, Althusius' views on popular sovereignty are conceived 
                                            
83  Althusius Politica 25. This view runs through all of Althusius' work. See further for 
example Althusius Politica 19, 40. 
84  Dealt with in Malan 2015 THRHR 248-266. 
85  The way in which the (individual) right to association is conceived is also informed 
by the Altusian, in contrast to the modernist, view of contract. In terms of the 
modernist view, human association would be viewed as a consequence – a creature 
– of individual action. The Althusian view would hold that association is a fact of 
existing common human bonds among people already sharing such bonds, which is 
the necessary conditio sine qua non for such individual action, which once again 
does not really create but merely refines the association in question. Hence, 
association is not the consequence of individual action alone, but rather the 
consequence of already existing community bonds, which are refined by individual 
action. Protection of the right of association would therefore not only require 
individual choice (to associate or to disassociate) to be protected, but also that the 
integrity of the communities be protected, because without the latter the former 
would not be possible. 
86  In pre-modern society, communal custom, which may be viewed as an expression 
of the popular (commonwealth/community) sovereignty, constituted the law – also 
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in such a way that they form the basis for the federal dispensations of limited 
(constitutional) government and not a justification for absolutist popular 
power in terms of the Volente Generale as advocated by Rousseau. 
Althusius' views on sovereignty are of crucial importance with regard to his 
views on constitutionalism, which together with his republican federalism 
and his explanation of the role of the office of the ephores constitute the 
most important structures of Althusian constitutionalism. 
In Althusius' view political authority, or the right to sovereignty as he calls it, 
vests inalienably in the commonwealth. The commonwealth is the totality of 
Althusius' compound constitution, made up by particular sovereignty-
sharing communities organised on a federal basis of the principle of 
subsidiarity. The "owner and usufructuary of sovereignty is the total of all 
the people…" associated in one symbiotic body from many smaller 
associations.87 The commonwealth lives by its sovereignty, failing which the 
commonwealth crumbles and dies and is unworthy of the name 
commonwealth.88 As long as the commonwealth remains commonwealth it 
is incapable of parting with its sovereignty and cannot transfer it even if it 
wants to renounce it.89 Although the administration of sovereignty may be 
assigned to a prince (or a collections of office-bearers), it remains immortally 
and perpetually with the commonwealth. Hence, when the prince dies, 
sovereignty still vests with the commonwealth, which may then entrust the 
administration of such sovereignty to another.90 The administration of 
sovereignty by the prince, rector or other functionaries can legitimately be 
entrusted only to the whole of the commonwealth and not to only a part of 
it. Hence, it would be foolish and arrogant for one or more persons to 
appropriate for themselves so much power as to lay down binding law for 
all.91 Referring to the Digest L 17 32 (in the Justinian Code) as authority, 
Althusius argues as follows: 
For by natural law (ius naturale) all men are equal and subject to the 
jurisdiction of no one, unless they subject themselves to another's imperium 
by their own consent and voluntary act, and transfer to another their rights, 
which no other person can claim for himself without a just title received from 
their owner.92  
                                            
the supreme law (the constitution). Hence, popular sovereignty and sovereignty of 
the law were not adversaries (as they are in terms of modern constitutional doctrine) 
but were unified in a single system. See Malan 2015 THRHR 248-266. 
87  Althusius Politica 13. 
88  Althusius Politica 7. 
89  Althusius Politica 13. 
90  Althusius Politica 7. 
91  Althusius Politica 176. 
92  Althusius Politica 95. 
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Government is a natural phenomenon in Althusius' view. It is natural to rule 
and to direct, as it is natural to be ruled and be directed. Althusius' Christian 
humanism is once again prominent in this context since it is authorised in 
terms of natural, divine and human law.93 In accordance with his view on 
the sovereignty of the commonwealth, Althusius teaches that government – 
the administrators – are not more but less important than the 
commonwealth. They have less authority and power than those who 
constituted them and from whom they have received their power, because 
the imperium and the power conceded to them are always less than the 
residual power of the commonwealth.94 In terms of Althusius' view of the 
sovereignty of the commonwealth, such residual power will always be 
sufficient to remedy whatever wrongs may have been committed by a 
political order.95 The administrators are nevertheless called superiors. Yet 
this superiority applies vis-a-vis the individual symbiotes over whom they 
exercise authority and not over the commonwealth as a whole.96 
Sovereignty, however, does not mean unrestrained supreme power. It is not 
final and conclusive power, that is, power finally free from checks and 
balances in a contemporary sense. On the contrary, Althusius emphasises 
that sovereignty does not denote supreme power without any constraints of 
the law. Such unconstrained supreme power would degenerate into tyranny, 
constituting an affront to law.97 This view brings us to the second aspect of 
Althusius' view on sovereignty, namely the sovereignty of the law. Reflecting 
a long-standing tradition of supremacy of the (fundamental) law predating 
Althusius' times,98 Althusius also strongly subscribes to the sovereignty of 
the law as part of the essential basis for the constitutional order.99 He 
declares as follows: 
                                            
93  Althusius Politica 97. 
94  Althusius Politica 97. 
95  Althusius Politica 119. 
96  Althusius Politica 97. Also see 111, where Althusius expressed similar views in 
response to the absolutist views of William Barclay, which he was at great pains to 
reject. Also see 120. 
97  Althusius Politica 71. This view of Althusius' is in line with a longstanding view of 
both classical and medieval political thought that distinguished between the true 
king, who was subject to the law, as opposed to the tyrant, who was absolved from 
the controls of the law. See for example Carlyle History of Medieval Political Theory 
115-116, 184. Interestingly, in typical medieval fashion, Bodin's sovereign is still not 
as powerful as that of Hobbes, as the former's sovereign is still subject to certain 
principles of divine and natural law. See Sheppard 1930 Polit Sci Q 586-596. 
98  For a discussion and reference to the relevant sources on sovereignty on the 
supremacy of the law, see Malan 2015 THRHR 248-266. 
99  Althusius Politica 111, 115, 123, 128. 
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All power is limited by definite boundaries and law. No power is absolute, 
infinite, unbridled, arbitrary and lawless. Every power is bound to laws, right 
and equity. Likewise, every civil power that is constituted by legitimate means 
can be terminated and abolished.100 
According to Althusius the supreme magistrate has only the power assigned 
to him by the populace and he is therefore no absolute ruler at all. In his 
chapters on the supreme magistrate (dealt with in chapters 10 and 20 of the 
Politica), Althusius states as follows: 
Such is the nature of the contractual mandate. The less the power of those 
who rule, the more secure and stable the imperium remains. For power is 
secure than places a control upon force, that rules willing subjects, and that is 
circumscribed by laws, so that it does not become haughty and engages in 
excesses to ruin the subjects, nor degenerate into tyranny… . Absolute power, 
or which is called the plenitude of power cannot be given to the supreme 
magistrate. For first, he who employs a plenitude of power breaks through the 
restraints by which human society has been contained. Second, by absolute 
power justice is destroyed, and when justice is taken away realms become 
bands of robbers as Augustine says. Thirdly, such absolute power regards not 
the utility and welfare of subjects, but private pleasure. Power, however, is 
established for the utility of those who are ruled, not for those who rule, and 
the utility of the people or subjects who are ruled does not in the least require 
unlimited power. Adequate provision has been made for them by laws. Finally, 
absolute power is wicked and prohibited. For we cannot do what can only be 
done injuriously. Thus even almighty God is said not to be able to do what is 
evil and contrary to nature.101 
2.4 Political authority and public office 
In step with a long-standing tradition of political thought in classical and 
medieval political thought,102 Althusius teaches that political authority can 
be exercised legitimately only within the constraints of the law103 and to the 
benefit of the whole of the political community - all subjects individually and 
collectively.104 These perspectives are closely intertwined with and logically 
implied in Althusius' convictions on community, sovereignty of the law, 
popular sovereignty, and covenant, as discussed in 2.1 to 2.3 above. 
Althusius explains that the administration of the king (the supreme 
                                            
100  Althusius Politica 115. 
101  Althusius Politica 121-122 (footnotes omitted). 
102  Political philosophy since Plato's Republic has asserted the principle that genuine 
political office is exercised for common good, that is, for the whole of the political 
community and not only for part of it. Political office exercised to the benefit of only 
one section of the political community is by definition not political office any more. It 
is either faction rule or outright corruption. 
103  See for example Althusius Politica 98, 120. 
104  This is asserted at Althusius Politica 20, 93 but runs through all of Althusius' 
argumentations. 
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magistrate) is not plenary, absolute and unrestricted; it does not allow the 
detriment and ruin of the subjects. The law and the welfare of the subjects 
set the boundaries of limited government within which political authority 
must be exercised.105 If an administrator oversteps the limits and no longer 
serves the commonwealth, he is not a public office bearer any more. He 
then becomes a private person to whom obedience is no longer owed in 
relation to any action which exceeds the limits of his authority.106 In a 
passage that encapsulates the close affinity of his views on public office 
with community, the sovereignty of the law and of the commonwealth and 
the notion of covenant, Althusius declares: 
Nor did the commonwealth, in constituting administrators for itself, deprive 
itself of the means of self-protection, and thus expose itself to the plundering 
of administrators. Besides, whatever power the people did not have it could 
not transfer to the administrators. Therefore, whatever power and right the 
administrators did not receive from the people, they do not have, they cannot 
exercise over the people, nor ought they be able to do so.107 
Public office bearers are by virtue of the power vested in them by law entitled 
to exercise their authority, but their authority is primarily associated with the 
notion of service and not with power. They must therefore exercise their 
authority in the interest of the public good of the commonwealth, which 
means that they are essentially servants of the commonwealth. They 
(including the supreme magistrate) are there for the commonwealth and not 
vice versa, the commonwealth is not there for them. Accordingly, in the 
words of Casey "(l)eadership is service which one renders for the good of 
others and not a status to be had for one's own gratification or 
aggrandisement".108 
Althusius subscribes to the long-standing distinction between the true king 
– the true public office-bearer – who acts according to the law and to benefit 
the commonwealth, and the tyrant who acts outside the law and to his own 
private benefit.109 Althusius also subscribes to the equally long-standing 
duty to obey the (law-abiding) king in contrast to the (law-defying) tyrant.110 
                                            
105  Althusius Politica 111, 121. 
106  Althusius Politica 98, 111, 112. This view is in step with a long-standing tradition of 
medieval political thought and is articulated in the well-known Calvinistic tract entitled 
the Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos published in 1579, discussed by Sabine History of 
Political Theory 378-384. 
107  Althusius Politica 98-99.  
108  Casey Freedom's Progress 403. 
109  For this longstanding distinction see fn 97.  
110  See Malan 2015 THRHR 248-266 and the sources referred to there. 
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Public office-bearing is an august duty. The highest public office-bearers 
have great authority. Affluence may accompany the heavy responsibilities 
of highest public office-bearers. That, however, is dependent on the office-
bearer's acting under the law and to the benefit of the commonwealth. 
Moreover, public office-bearing is associated with close cooperation 
between office bearers and the commonwealth – between the governors 
and the governed – in accordance with the appropriate role for each in 
contributing to the well-being of the polity. In this regard Althusius declares: 
The right of the king consists in the faithful and diligent care and administration 
of the commonwealth entrusted to him by the people. For this reason the 
people transfers to him as much and authority it judges necessary. By the 
communication, sharing and contribution of individual persons from the 
people, the king becomes rich and powerful. By their counsel he becomes 
wise. By the aid of his subjects he exercises strength, vigor and might. If the 
people deny this to the king, he again becomes weak, poor needy and a 
private person …111  
In the final analysis, government must be limited in order to ensure the 
benefits enunciated as follows by Althusius: 
The less the power of those who rule, the more secure and stable the 
imperium remains. For power is secure that places a control upon force, that 
rules willing subjects, and that is circumscribed by law, so that it does not 
become haughty and engage in excesses to the ruin of the subjects, nor 
degenerate into tyranny …112 
3 Conclusion 
This concludes the discussion of the foundational tenets of Althusius' 
constitutionalism. A constitutional order based only on principles without 
accompanying structures and mechanisms is clearly not really viable. On 
the other hand, a constitutional order restricted to mechanisms and 
structures but without principles is equally inconceivable. Althusius' 
foundational tenets combine Biblical, classical (more specifically 
Aristotelian), Medieval and pre-modern political thinking and political 
experience into a coherent political and constitutional theory. On that score 
it is historically illuminating. 
This, however, does not exhaust the significance of these tenets. They are 
also of importance for present-day constitutionalism. That is not to say that 
they can simply be transplanted into our modern-day constitutional law. For 
that they are clearly inadequate, for two specific reasons. First, they do not 
                                            
111  Althusius Politica 114. 
112  Althusius Politica 121. This is to my mind a striking formulation of constitutionalism. 
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account for the emergence and the domination of the territorial state, which 
came about after Althusius. Secondly, Althusiun thinking was conceived 
before the advent of the individual and of individual rights which came to full 
fruition only in the twentieth century.  
Still, however, there are important aspects of Althusius' foundational tenets 
which are of value for our present-day political and constitutional discourse. 
The following aspects may be highlighted. First, Althusius provides a 
valuable source for modern-day communitarian theory, which has become 
an increasingly important theme of contemporary politics and constitutional 
law. Communitarianism dispenses with the notion of the abstract individual. 
It highlights the truth that (individual) identity, morality and a happy life can 
be conceived of and achieved only within the framework of communities. 
This leads to the second point, which is that individual rights are quite often 
meaningful only within a communal framework. In the absence of 
communities, individual rights can often not be exercised at all. To the extent 
that communities are not recognised, individual rights are therefore quite 
often impoverished.113 Althusian communitarianism is therefore an 
important source for a politics of recognition from which not only 
communities, but also individuals stand to benefit.  
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